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Intervention Index and Exchange Rate Regimes:  
The Cases of Selected East-Asian Economies   
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Given the absence of publicly available information on foreign exchange 
intervention, we propose an index of central bank intervention in the exchange 
market to classify exchange rate regimes adopted by four East Asian economies. We 
revisit an old debate on whether these crisis-effected East Asia countries have 
indeed returned to their pre-1997 rigid exchange rate policies. If, instead, there had 
been evidences of a policy shift to a more flexible regime, was the move voluntary, or 
mainly due to high market pressures on the currency? Our findings clearly reject the 
“hollow middle” hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a great deal of efforts expended in developing behavioural 
classifications of exchange rate regimes by either looking exclusively at the 
behaviour of nominal exchange rates, or considering fluctuations in both the nominal 
exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)). Viewing from a rather narrow perspective, 
these considerable efforts seem to be primarily motivated by a crucial recognition of 
the shortcoming of the Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).1  
The urgency has however been driven by much more than just the need to 
construct a robust classification of the exchange rate regime. With more developing 
countries have moved to liberalize their economies in the last two decades and at 
relatively more rapid phases than in the past, the types of exchange rate regimes 
adopted by them have been repetitively demonstrated to have significant influences 
on the eventual bearings of the financial liberalization on the development phases of 
their domestic economies. Early works such as Eichengreen (1994),  Diaz-Alejandro 
(1985), Chang and Valesco (2000) and Wyplosz (2001) contend that  it is crucial to 
realize ex ante that liberalization rocks the exchange markets, and building some 
form of exchange rate flexibility (either by floating or by being prepared to realign 
pegs) into the liberalization programme is, therefore, essential.  
Providing more up-to-date evidences, a work by di Giovanni and Shambaugh 
(2008) highlights the real cost to the loss of monetary autonomy that comes with the 
pegged exchange rate policy. They demonstrate that annual real output growth in 
countries (both developed and developing economies) is negatively associated with 
                                                
1
 Often regarded as the primary source of information on the official or de-jure exchange rate 
policies pursued by member countries, the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restriction has often been blamed for taking the face value on 
what the countries announce until late 1990s.In view of this, the IMF moved to a de-facto 
classification in 1999, and aimed to describe what member countries actually do rather than 
what they say that they do (Genberg and Swoboda (2004)). 
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interest rates in their major trading partners, but this effect holds only for countries 
with fixed exchange rate.   
However, the underlying concern here, as discussed earlier, is on the 
identification of the regime. Can we estimate how much more (or less) flexible the 
exchange rate regime of a country has indeed become during the past few years? 
Furthermore, can we consistently classify countries’ de-facto regimes of exchange 
rate and separate the flexible from the dirty float regimes? Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
for instance show that many countries which declare a flowing exchange rate regime 
in fact heavily manage their currencies. Failing to appropriately classify the de-facto 
regime of exchange rate would arguably weaken the analyses and, therefore, 
undermine our understanding of the link between the exchange rate regime and the 
overall benefits of the financial liberalization on the development of the domestic 
economy.  
Despite the numerous attempts to classify exchange rate regimes, we have 
not, however, seen conclusive and consistent findings (Table 2). Kawai and Akiyama 
(2000) for instance failed to conclusively classify the regime adopted in Indonesia in 
1999. Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), on the other hand, categorize the exchange 
rate regime in Indonesia for that same year as independently floating.  In addition, 
shortcomings associated with the methodologies, in particular with the underlying 
statistical assumptions of the testing, were often found on early studies.2 
For this study, our approach will be to verify the type of exchange rate 
regimes adopted by four East Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand, through the examination of the exchange market intervention activities 
of the monetary authorities of each country. Given the absence of publicly available 
information on the timing and the size of the intervention in the foreign exchange 
market during the observation period, we will have to first construct an index of 
                                                
2
 Refer to section 2 on the Literature Reviews. 
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central bank exchange market intervention by borrowing relevant concepts originally 
introduced by the seminal work of Girton-Roper (1977).  
To trace how volatilities of different components of the intervention index 
evolve overtime, we apply the Markov-Switching ARCH (SWARCH) procedure. This 
empirical approach significantly departs from those taken by previous works that 
have also attempted to construct measures of indices of intervention (see for 
instance, Weymark (1997) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998))3. The application 
of the SWARCH allows us to move away from static analyses to capture the shift in 
the policy preference of the monetary authorities of these East Asian economies. The 
transition from one exchange rate regime to another and the policy instruments being 
employed will be explicitly captured by the SWARCH results. 
  Once we have generated the intervention index for each country case, the 
next task is to calculate regime thresholds for each currency. The idea here is to 
estimate a threshold where we can systematically categorize a regime characterized 
by excessive intervention activities of the monetary authority and separate it from that 
of low exchange market intervention regime. Given the potential diversities between 
the behaviours of the four currencies and the activities of the monetary authorities of 
these countries, it is imperative that we avoid imposing a “common regional set” of 
thresholds for all currencies without the full understanding of the statistical properties 
of each currency.  
In particular, due the non-normality of the statistical distribution of the 
intervention index series, we have to avoid relying on parametric measurements, 
such as variance and standard deviation where they are prone to outliers and 
structural breaks, in identifying the threshold levels.  Accordingly, we apply the 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and adopt a modified estimator proposed by Huisman, 
Koedijk, Kool, and Palm (2001) ---henceforth HKKP. The application of HKKP 
                                                
3
  To our knowledge only Masson (2001) has adopted the Markov-approach. Bubula and Otker-Robe 
(2002) follow Masson (2001) in their empirical approach. 
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enables us to generate more consistent analyses even with relatively small sample 
sizes.    
The construction of the intervention index and the rigorous testing enable us 
to generate further critical assessments of the exchange rate policy, beyond 
previously discussed.  Instead of just revealing evidences that some of these crisis-
effected countries in East Asia have already moved to a more flexible regime in 
recent years, the more insightful and pertinent policy concerns will be to examine 
whether the shift from a rigid policy to a flexible one has indeed been a “voluntary” 
policy decision, not due to the presence of strong market pressures on the local 
currency. In short, our study aims to further examine the degree and the credibility of 
the policy commitment of the central bank to move to a more flexible exchange rate 
regime.4  
The outline of the paper is as follows. A brief literature review will be 
presented in section 2. The next section discusses the basic concepts behind the 
construction of the intervention index. The two key empirical tools, namely, the 
SWARCH and the EVT, are discussed in section 4. Data and empirical test results 
are presented in section 5. Based on the findings reported in section 5, we evaluate 
the exchange regimes of the four East Asian economies in section 6. A brief 
concluding section ends the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Previous studies that have examined the actual or de-facto exchange rate 
arrangements in place in most of the countries in East Asia have proceeded in two 
ways (Table 1). One approach is to test if the countries assigned weights either to a 
specific currency or to a basket of currencies using a simple regression model. 
                                                
4
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)) has also highlighted the need for the future researches in this 
area to examine further the nature of the shift from a rigid exchange rate to a flexible regime, 
in particular, whether the shift has indeed been a voluntary one.  
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Originally developed and applied by Frankel and Wei in a series of studies (1993, 
1994, and 1995), the regression model estimates an equation of the form: 
t
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Where jte∆  is the monthly change in the log exchange rate of currency j in month t, α 
is a constant term, βk (k = 1, 2, .., 5) is the coefficient on the monthly change in the 
log exchange rate of currency k, and ut is the residual term. The superscripts USD, 
DM, JY, FF, and UKP refer to the dollar, the deutschemark, the yen, the French 
franc, and the U.K. pound, respectively. All exchange rates are expressed in terms of 
a certain numeraire currency, usually the Swiss franc.  
The intuition behind the model is that the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the weights assigned by the respective authorities to the 
corresponding currencies in their exchange rate policies (Kawai and Akiyama, 2000). 
In doing so, one can then identify to which specific currency or a basket of currencies 
that monetary authorities have tended to stabilise their exchange rates.  
 The Frankel-Wei model does not come without its criticisms. First, McCauley 
(2001) pointed out that the high estimated coefficients (weights) for the U.S. dollar 
does not necessarily imply that these currencies were pegging to the U.S. dollar. 
Instead, these statistics may suggest that the East Asian currencies belong to the 
U.S. dollar bloc, “or at least that they have not slipped from the dollar bloc into the 
euro bloc” (McCauley, p. 47). McCauley’s basis for this distinction between bloc 
membership and de-facto pegging (the latter being the preferred interpretation of 
McKinnon among others) is that “currencies can float freely and yet belong to a bloc” 
(p.46). The paper further argues that “if belonging to the dollar bloc is taken to be the 
same as being pegged to the dollar, then the Canadian and Australian dollars must 
be considered pegged to the U.S. dollar” (p. 46). 
  The second criticism has something to do with the choice of the numeraire 
currency. The problem with this empirical strategy is that the numeraire currency 
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should not be linked to any of the currencies in the basket (Benassy-Quere and 
Coeure, 2000)5. For instance in Equation 1, the Swiss franc, as the numeraire 
currency, is linked to the DM/euro and the U.S. dollar.            
The other alternative approach is to assess the degree of commitment by 
countries to exchange rate stabilisation by arriving at a statistical descriptive measure 
of observed volatilities in exchange rates, stock of foreign exchange reserves and 
interest rates. The basic idea behind this approach is that exchange rate stabilisation 
is not observed through movements alone (or the lack of it) in the nominal exchange 
rate, but also through interventions in the foreign exchange market and monetary 
policy actions which moderate or suppressed supposed movements in the nominal 
exchange rate. There is a scant of studies (e.g., Baig (2001) and Hernandez and 
Montiel (2003)) that have directly used this approach.6 However, the two studies also 
have their own limitations.  
First, these studies adopted standard deviations of the volatility 
measurements as the commonly used parametric measure of volatility. However, any 
standard deviation measure is a form of averaging and is only an appropriate 
measure when the conventional parametric assumption of normal distribution needed 
to employ such a measurement is met.7 In fact, as early as the 1960s, the non-
normality of any speculative price series such as the exchange rate and the interest 
rates has already been clearly recognised.8  
                                                
5
 In one of the earlier Frankel-Wei (1995) paper, they also used the Swiss franc as the 
numeraire, but this was arguably appropriate as they only had the U.S. dollar and the 
Japanese yen as the exogenous variables.  
 
6
 McKinnon and Schnabl (2002) can also be added to these two studies, however, they only 
looked at exchange rate volatility. 
 
7
 Hernandez and Montiel (2003) used, aside from the standard deviation, the range and mean 
absolute change of the respective changes in exchange rate, stock of foreign exchange 
reserves and interest rate, while, Baig (2001) used only the standard deviation of the changes 
of the same three series.   
 
8
 See, for example, the collection of papers by Mandelbrot (1963, 1964, 1967), Fama (1965, 
1970) among others. 
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Second, it is customary practice of these studies to compare the observed 
volatility outcomes of the East Asian countries’ exchange rates, stock of foreign 
exchange reserves, and interest rates across a benchmark of acknowledged ‘clean’ 
floaters, which are also mostly developed countries with more advanced and well-
developed financial markets. However, this approach rests on the strong implicit 
assumption that the shocks experienced by these countries were uniform over time 
and across countries, which is an unlikely case.9     
As will be elaborated further in the next section, our approach will also involve 
examining three key indicators, namely the foreign exchange reserve, the interest 
rate, and the nominal exchange rate. Instead of looking at those indicators 
individually however, we will employ them to construct an intervention index of the 
central bank for each individual country case. The Markov-Switching ARCH and the 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) methodologies will then be applied to measure the 
index and to estimate the appropriate maximum and minimum thresholds.         
 
3. Intervention Index 
In their seminal work, Girton-Roper (1977) show that any excess demand for 
foreign exchange can be fulfilled through non-mutually exclusive conduits. If market 
pressures on a particular currency, or often referred to as speculative pressures, 
have successfully targeted a currency, then there would likely be a sharp 
depreciation of the domestic currency. However, at other times, the attack can be 
repelled or warded off through raising interest rates and/or running down on the 
foreign exchange reserves.  
Therefore, volatility alone in the nominal exchange rate understates the 
magnitude of speculative attacks as this excludes episodes of unsuccessful attacks. 
Government policies manifested through interest rate policy actions in the money 
market and purchase or sell of international reserves in the foreign exchange market, 
                                                
9
 This argument was also recognized by Hernandez and Montiel (2003).  
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moderate supposed large movements in exchange rates. In the same manner, 
considering in isolation, movements in reserves and interest rate aside from 
exchange rates also offer only a partial view of the severity of shocks in the 
economy.  
Based on that seminal idea of Girton-Roper (1977), we can generate two sets 
of measures or proxies. First, by combining the information gathered from the foreign 
exchange reserve position of the central bank and its key policy interest rate, one can 
develop a measure of the monetary authority’s propensity to intervene and manage 
the fluctuations of the local currency. Second, we can also add the information on the 
exchange rate fluctuations of the local currency to the monetary authority’s 
intervention objectives in order to construct a reasonable estimate of the extent of 
currency attacks on the market, or commonly referred to as the index of exchange 
market pressure (EMP).10    
It is important to note however that the definition of  EMP in our study is more 
closely in line with that of Weymark (1997), whereby the exchange market pressure 
measures the total excess demand for the domestic currency in the international 
market as the exchange rate change that would have been required to remove the 
excess demand in the absence of market intervention by the monetary authority. 
Girton-Ropter (1977) instead defines its EMP as a measure of excess demand for 
money in the domestic money market, hence focusing solely on pressures arising 
from the domestic economy. 
To construct the intervention index, we first estimate the “smoothed” 
probabilities of each key indicator (interest rate, reserve, and exchange rate) to be in 
the high-volatility state by adopting the markov-regime switching ARCH (to be 
elaborated further in the next section). A large (small) value for the smoothed 
probability of high-volatility state of the exchange rate at time t, for instance, suggests 
                                                
10
  This general idea of exchange market pressure index has been well developed by early 
studies such as Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., and Wyplosz (1995), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
Reinhart (1998) and Weymark (1998).  
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that there is a high (low) probability of volatile exchange rate during that specific 
period (t). This is a useful measure as it conveys information about the nature of the 
market and the policy stance.   
Next, taking the ratio of the smoothed probabilities of high volatility state of 
the monetary authority intervention and the exchange market pressure, we arrive at 
the intervention index of the monetary authority (Equation 2): 
 
Index of Intervention )(INTV   = H
r
H
reserves
H
exr
H
r
H
reserves
ppp
pp
int
int
++
+
           (2) 
 
Where: H r
H
reserves
H
exr ppp int,, are the smoothed probabilities that the conditional variance 
of the changes in exchange rate, reserves, and interest rates, respectively, are in a 
high-volatility state at period )(t . The denominator ( H rHreservesHexr ppp int++ ) captures the 
smoothed probability of a high exchange market pressure on the currency. It is the 
probability of the ‘total’ pressure place upon by market shocks on the exchange rate, 
and is measured as the sum of the smoothed probabilities of the high variability in 
exchange rate ( Hexrp ) and the smoothed probabilities of the high variability of the 
monetary policy actions in the exchange markets ( H rHreserves pp int+ ) (Glick and 
Wihlbourg, 1997). 
Our INTV index denotes that when analysing exchange rate policy, examining 
alone the behaviour of the exchange rate offers us only a partial picture. The 
exchange rate volatility can be low because of government policy actions manifested 
through monetary policy and interventions in the foreign exchange market 
( )H rHreserves pp int+ , or because there are relatively few shocks or modest exchange 
market pressures ( )H rHreservesHexr ppp int++ . Thus, to clasify a country’s exchange rate 
policy, we need, at the very least, to look both at the information conveyed by the 
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exchange rate changes and the intervention activities of the central bank (Willett, 
2004).  
There are a number of advantages of adopting the INTV index. First, the 
inclusion of the interest rate variable in the INTV index extends earlier models, such 
as that of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and Weymark (1997).  Given the 
frequent use of interest rate adjustments to defend the local currency, especially 
during times of heavy market pressures against the local currency, it is vital that we 
include this policy instrument in our INTV index.11  
Second, early studies constructed their indices of exchange market pressure 
and intervention index by including actual percentage changes of the key relevant 
variables. Since the volatility of one variable, such as the monthly changes in the 
exchange rate, may completely dominate the others, early indices place a strong 
emphasis on the weights of the three variables/ components of the index. The weight 
assigned varies from one study to another, and it is often unclear as to how the 
weight was calculated.  
In contrast, our INTV index relies on the probability of each of its components 
to be in its high volatile state. The probability of each series is equally ranged from 0 
to 1 at any point of time, including the crisis period. An INTV index closes to one 
(zero) should suggest that there is a high (low) propensity to intervene, and thus 
suggesting a rigid (flexible) exchange rate regime. Hence, the INTV index is simpler 
to construct, does not rely on any arbitrary weighting scheme and is therefore more 
transparently generated. 
Thirdly, the application of time-varying smoothed probabilities of the markov-
regime switching ARCH means that our index does not require a priori dating of 
crisis, speculative attack periods or abrupt shift from one type of exchange rate 
                                                
11
  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) did not include the interest rate component in their 
application due to the lack of complete interest data for the countries that they examined. 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), on the other hand, include the level of domestic 
interest rate in their index of exchange market pressure. 
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regime to another. The dynamics of the smoothed probabilities of each variable 
means that the INTV index will endogenously capture the trends and signal the 
timing of the following possible events: a significant rise in market pressure (i.e. the 
speculative attack periods); a rise in the intervention activities of the monetary 
authority; and more importantly a shift to a different regime of exchange rate. Lastly, 
given the construction of the INTV index, different possible scenarios on the regime 
classifications can be conveniently derived, as will be shown in the empirical section 
of the paper.  
One caveat must be added here. As for any economic indicators or indexes, 
the accuracy of the INTV index would highly depend on the quality of the 
“determinant” variables, in particular the reserve and the interest rate. In the absence 
of publicly available information on intervention in the foreign exchange market, we 
follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in using changes in reserves as the imperfect 
measure of foreign exchange intervention, while intervention in money markets is 
measured by changes in interest rates.12  
These indicators are imperfect measure as we recognize that not all 
movements or changes in reserve or interest rate are due to or associated with 
interventions to defend or smooth the fluctuations of the local currency. However, 
only few central banks have in fact publicly announced their foreign exchange 
intervention activities. These are largely monetary authorities from the industrialized 
economies, such as Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia. 13 
                                                
12
 As will be discussed in section 5, line 11 of the IMF-IFS is used as the measure of the stock 
of foreign exchange reserves instead of line 1Ld (international reserves data). The advantage 
of using line 11 is that it includes borrowed money, which can be used for foreign exchange 
intervention, while, line 1Ld may change due to a host of other reasons not entirely connected 
to intervention such as, fluctuations in valuations, accrual of interest earnings, and money in 
the IMF that can or cannot be used. We thank Charles Wyplosz for pointing this out.    
  
13
 Refer to Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2005), Fatum (2005), Pierdzioch and 
Stadtmann (2003) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005). 
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None of the central banks from the emerging markets in East Asia has transparently 
disclosed their intervention activities.14  
 
4. SWARCH and Extreme Value Theory 
4.1 Markov-Regime Switching ARCH (SWARCH) 
 Hamilton and Susmel (1994) proposed an extension of the standard ARCH 
model which can incorporate regime shifts. In their model, the parameters of the 
ARCH process are allowed to switch between discrete numbers of states, with the 
transitions between states governed by a finite-order Markov process. Hamilton and 
Susmel called this the switching ARCH or, simply, SWARCH model. For this study, 
the Markov representation allows us to compresses the history of exchange rate 
regimes into a single matrix that can then be employed to capture the shifts and the 
transition stages from one exchange rate regime to another.   
The SWARCH model can be described by the following system of equations: 
,110 ttt rr εφφ +∆+=∆ −  tε  ),0(~1 tt hNI −           (3) 
)( ttt sgu=ε    Ks ,....,1=                                       (4) 
;ttt vhu =      )1,0(~ Nvt                                                  (5) 
∑
=
−
+=
q
i
itit uh
1
2
0
2 αα                                                              (6) 
 Equation (3) assumes that the return )( tr follows a first-order autoregressive 
scheme. The returns innovations ( )tε  are assumed to follow an ARCH process with 
conditional variance 2th  where 2th  depends linearly on q past squared errors, i.e., 
2
itu − . In standard ARCH models, the parameters are constant across regimes. In the 
                                                
14
 Therefore it is difficult for instance to distangle interest rate adjustments to manage 
exchange rate volatilities form those measures taken to stabilize inflation and output-gap.  But 
it is still pertinent that the interest rate variable be included in measuring intervention activities 
of the central banks, as argued by the past literatures discussed earlier and also will be 
shown further in the empirical section.  
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SWARCH model, however, the ARCH parameters are allowed to switch 
endogenously between a set of discrete states )(K . The move from one state to 
another represents a change in the scale of the volatility process. This is represented 
above by g(st) as the constant switching or variance factor, which depends on the 
state variable, Kst ,....,1= . In this representation, a normalization is imposed such 
that 1)1( =g  and 1)( ≥tsg for Kst ,....,1= . Hence, State 1 may be viewed as the low 
volatility state. For 1≠ts , )( tsg therefore indicates the magnitude of volatility at 
ts relative to the low volatility state.   
 Following Hamilton and Susmel (1994), ts is assumed to follow an 
unobserved first-order K-Markov process, which can be described by transition 
probabilities, .)/(),...,,/(
,..., ijttttttt pisjspyyksisjsP ======= −−−−− 12121 Each 
probability number, ( )ijp , is the probability that State i  is followed by State j . Define 
the probability transition matrix as follows: 
P =                                    (7) 
 
The sum of elements in each and every row in the above matrix should be equal to 1.
 One of the objectives of the SWARCH model is to predict the probability of 
occurrence of a state for each period, where it was shown by Hamilton and Susmel 
(1994) to be a by-product of a non-linear Markov-switching filter. For example, the 
inference that is based on information available or observed at time )(t is called the 
‘filter probability’. Alternatively, the inference using all sample observations is called 
the ‘smoothed probability’. The full sample smoothed probability represents the 
probability that the conditional variance was in state ts  at date )(t , given all sample 
of observations. Since the basis for the construction of the INTV index (Equation 2) is 
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expressed through the smoothed probabilities of the conditional variance being at the 
high-volatility state, the index is in effect constrained between 0 and 1.  
 
4.2 Intervention Threshold: Application of Extreme Value Theory 
 The next empirical challenge is to compare and contrast the pre-1997 
exchange regime with that of the post-1997 regime. The challenge here is to 
calculate the levels of INTV index that can be considered as High and Low INTV, 
suggesting less and more flexible exchange rate regimes, respectively. Without 
properly generating thresholds of High and Low levels of INTV index, the 
classification of the regimes based on the intervention index will be done in an ad-
hoc manner.  
The conventional approach of generating these thresholds is by simply 
employing the mean and the standard deviations of the INTV index. Studies such as 
Baig (2001) and Hernandez and Montiel (2003) employed thresholds using the mean 
and standard deviations in their own definition of an INTV index.15 The principal 
assumption of normal distribution however must hold for the application of the mean 
and standard deviation to be appropriate for any analyses on the series. However, as 
earlier mentioned, studies have documented that exchange rates, interest rates and 
foreign exchange reserves are not normally distributed.16   
To generate thresholds that are statistically consistent with the underlying 
INTV series, we adopt the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approach. This is a non-
parametic approach which would allow us to generate the maximum/high and 
minimum/low thresholds of the INTV index for each of the country cases without any 
a-priori assumption about the distribution of the series. 
                                                
15
 Similarly, early studies such as Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) also apply the mean and standard deviation measures to 
examine thresholds for the index of exchange market pressure. 
16
 Refer to Footnote 7 and Pontines and Siregar (2007). 
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Given the relatively small observation size that we have for this study, we 
apply the modified tail index estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and 
Palm (2001) ---henceforth HKKP---, which is unbiased in small sample cases. The 
HKKP methodology starts with the Hill (1975) estimator: 
))(ln()1(ln(1)(
1
knxjnx
k
k
k
j
−−+−= ∑
=
γ    (8) 
 Where we assume that there is a sample of n  positive independent observations 
drawn from some unknown fat-tailed distribution. Let the parameter γ  be the tail-
index of the distribution, and )(ix  be the i th-order statistic such that )()1( ixix ≤−  
for .,......,2 ni =  k  is the pre-specified number of tail observations. Naturally, the 
choice of k  is crucial to obtain an unbiased estimate of the tail-index. 
 HKKP (2001) shows that for a general class of distribution functions the 
asymptotic expected value of the conventional hill estimator to be biased and 
increasing monotonically with k . Similarly, the asymptotic variance of the Hill 
estimator to be proportional to .1 





k
 Generally, this problem will only be resolved 
when the sample size goes to infinity for given k . 
 For our small sample observations, HKKP (2001) introduces an estimator that 
overcomes the problem of the need to select a “single” optimal k  in small sample 
observations. HKKP (2001) proposes that for values of k  smaller than some 
threshold value κ , the bias of the conventional Hill estimate of γ  increases almost 
linearly in k  and can be approximated by: 
)()( 10 kkk εββγ ++= ,  κ,....,2,1=k    (9) 
where: 0β and 1β  are the intercept and the estimate coefficient. )(kε is a disturbance 
term.  HKKP (2001) also shows that the modified Hill estimator is quite robust with 
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the choice of κ to be around 
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n
. Accordingly, for our empirics, we propose to 
compute )(kγ  for a range value of k  from 1 to κ  (roughly equal to 





2
n ). 
Given our need to calculate the “high” and “low” thresholds of INTV index, our 
choice of κ  for the high threshold will contain the high or large observations of γ , 
associated with the large/high INTV index. Conversely, the low threshold will be the 
group of observation with the lower set of γ . 
 To estimate Equation (9), HKKP (2001) adopted the Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS), instead of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), to deal with the potential 
heteroscedasticity in the error term ))(( kε of Equation (9). The weight has 
( )k,......2,1  as diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere. The estimate of γ from 
the WLS regression is an approximately unbiased estimate of the tail-index.  
 
5. Empirics 
 Before turning into each set of testing, it is important to again lay out the key 
objectives and the rationales behing the empirical approaches adopted in the paper. 
Definitely, the estimation of the intervention index (Equation 2) can be pursued by 
either panel or individual time-series approaches. However, as indicated in the 
introduction, the task here is to classify each individual exchange rate regime 
adopted by the four East Asian economies from January 1985 to August 2007.  
Therefore, rather than treating all four East Asian countries as a panel, it would be 
more appropriate to estimate the intervention index (Equation 2) separately for each 
country. A number of apparent reasons as to why individual time-series testing is 
more suitable than panel testing to meet the primary tasks of this paper: 
a) It is important to recognize that each country may have its own unique 
experience with the management of its exchange rate policy. Eventhough, 
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all of them for instance may have adopted rigid exchange rate policy, but 
the degrees of rigidity vary from one country to another, as will be shown 
in the later part of the paper. 
b) Estimating the components of the intervention index for each indiividual 
country enables us to understand the types of monetary policy 
instruments being employed at different periods by the monetary 
authorities of each of these economies in managing their currencies. 
c) Given the possible diversities in the regimes adopted by the four 
economies, it is imperative that we avoid imposing a “common regional 
set” of thresholds for all currencies without prior understanding of the 
statistical properties of each currency –a common limitation of the panel 
testing. 
 
5.1 Data 
 The data consist of monthly time series of nominal exchange rate expressed 
in local currency per U.S. dollar, overnight money market rates as the measure of 
domestic interest rates, and foreign assets of monetary authorities as the measure of 
foreign exchange reserves for Indonesia, Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The 
sample observations cover the period from January 1985 to August 2007, and were 
gathered from the IMF International Financial Statistics. In Table 2, summary 
statistics are presented for the monthly percentage changes of exchange rates and 
foreign exchange reserves, and first-differences of the interest rates. 
In addition, Table 2 also contains information on the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness coefficient, kurtosis coefficient, Jarque-Bera normality test (JB), 
and Ljung-Box (LB) test. All three series for the four countries show non-normality 
(note the JB test results), and the kurtosis coefficient indicates fat-tailedness, which 
is also behind the rejection of normality. The Ljung-Box (LB) statistics suggest 
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significant autocorrelation with the exceptions of Indonesia (reserves), Korea 
(reserves) and Singapore (exchange rate and interest rate). The Ljung-Box (LBS) 
statistics, for the squared levels, are also significant, with the exceptions of Indonesia 
(exchange rate, reserves), Korea (exchange rate) and Singapore (reserves). This is 
largely taken as evidence for an ARCH-type process for the conditional variance.  
 
5.2 SWARCH Test Results and INTV Index 
Next we proceed in using the (SWARCH) model of Hamilton and Susmel 
(1994). Tables 3-5 present the estimates from the Markov-switching ARCH. To 
incorporate regime shifts in the conditional variance, two and three states were 
estimated. Estimation was performed with both the normal and the t-distribution, with 
different lags. In order to arrive at the most plausible specification in describing the 
conditional volatility, a bottom-up strategy following Krolzig (1997) was pursued. The 
starting point is to formally test the null hypothesis of no regime switch (m = 1) 
against the alternative of a regime switch (m = 2). The test for the hypothesis of no 
regime switching is a likelihood ratio test comparing the standard ARCH model with 
the Markov-switching ARCH. 17  In all cases, conventional likelihood ratio test suggest 
that the null hypothesis of no regime switching can, indeed, be rejected.  
We then proceed to test the null hypothesis of two regimes (m = 2) against 
the alternative of three regimes (m = 3). On the basis of this test, most of the three 
series, i.e., monthly percentage changes of exchange rates and foreign exchange 
reserves, and first-differences of the interest rates, for the individual countries 
examined are adequately characterized as having at most two-volatility regimes, with 
the exceptions of the Indonesian rupiah and the Korean overnight money market 
                                                
17
 A word of caution is necessary in interpreting this result. In Markov switching models, the 
usual regularity conditions justifying the use of classical tests such as the likelihood ratio test 
are violated. This is because, under the null hypothesis of only one state, the transition 
probabilities are not identified, implying that the sample likelihood function is flat with respect 
to these parameters. As in Hamilton and Susmel (1994), the likelihood ratio test results 
mentioned here should be treated more as a descriptive summary than formal statistical tests. 
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rate. The coefficient estimates are in general statistically significant (Tables 3-5). The 
estimated transition probability of each state is quite high, suggesting that the states 
are highly persistent. For instance, the transition probability in the case of the 
Indonesian rupiah indicates that when the current regime is at state 1, there is a 94% 
chance that the sample for the next period will stay at state 1.  
In addition, from the estimates, one can also compute the expected duration 
of each volatility state as 





− iip1
1
. For example, state 1 for the Indonesian rupiah is 
expected to last on average for (1 – 0.94)-1 ≈ 17 months, state 2 can be expected to 
last on average for 10 months, and state 3 can be expected to last for 25 months 
(Table 3). Thus, state 3 (the high volatility state) will persist longer than states 1 (low 
volatility state) and 2 (medium volatility state). Finally, as a diagnostic test, Ljung-Box 
Q-statistics were tested for the standardised residuals, LB(24), and for the squared 
standardised residuals, LBS(24). Noticed that by using the SWARCH model, 
evidence of autocorrelation were either clearly reduced or eliminated.   
 
5.3 The EVT Thresholds and the Scenarios 
Based on the SWARCH test results, we can compute the estimated 
probabilities of high variability in exchange rate, reserve and interest rate during the 
observation period. From these estimated probabilities, the intervention (INTV) index 
can accordingly be constructed for each country (Figures 1-4). A higher INTV implies 
a higher propensity to intervene and thus a rigid exchange rate regime.  
The question now is at what level that the INTV index can be considered as 
high (or low). Given the non-normal distribution of the key series, namely the 
exchange rate, reserve and interest rate shown in Table 2, it is not surprising that we 
also find the INTV series for each of these economies to be non-normally 
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distributed.18 Mean and standard deviation are therefore not going to be accurate and 
appropriate indicators to generate thresholds separating the high levels of 
intervention from the low levels of intervention. This is where the EVT approach can 
be utilized.    
Employing the concept of the extreme value theory discussed earlier, we are 
able to calculate the “extreme maximum and minimum” of the INTV index for each 
country. The numbers in Table 6 suggest that the threshold for a high INTV index fall 
between a rather tight range, from 89 percent for the case of Indonesia to 98 percent 
for Singapore. In contrast, we find the range for the thresholds for the low INTV index 
to be substantial. In one end, the threshold for the low INTV for Korea is around 10 
percent. The minimum threshold for the INTV index for Singapore, on the other end, 
is estimated to be around 69 percent. The wide ranges of thresholds underscore the 
importance of estimating individual thresholds, before forming an appropriate 
regional threshold.  
A set of possible scenarios can be generated from the High and Low INTV 
classifications depicted in Table 6. To start with, it is arguably appropriate to 
conclude that INTV indexes to be at least (at most) around 90 percent (10 percent) 
can be considered a high (low) intervention scenario. There are two possible 
rationales behind the high INTV index: 
(a). Scenario #1: High and Successful Intervention Efforts. A high ( )INTV  
index, created by the high value of ( )H rHreserves pp int+ , leads to a stable local currency 
(low ( )Hexrp ). Here, we can conclusively argue that there is an attempt by the 
monetary authority to intervene and offset ‘market forces’ and hence, successfully 
limit exchange rate flexibility. 
                                                
18
 For the sake of brevity, we do not present the descriptive statistics for the INTV indices. 
They can be made available upon request. 
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(b). Scenario #2: Inconclusive case. A high ( )INTV Index due to low values for 
both ( )H rHreserves pp int+  and ( )H rHreservesHexr ppp int++ . Under this circumstance, hardly 
anything conclusive can be argued about the commitment of the monetary authority. 
The situation may prevail when for instance there is no significant shock in the 
foreign exchange market, and, consequently, no significant exchange market 
activities undertaken by the monetary authority. Therefore, one cannot say much 
about the policy as the low ( )H rHreserves pp int+ , or the lack of intervention policies, 
occurs because there is no need to intervene due to relatively calm market condition, 
reflected by low ( )H rHreservesHexr ppp int++ .  
On the other extreme, we have to estimate the regional minimum or low 
threshold of the INTV index ---henceforth refer to as Scenario #3. Given the wide 
ranges of the low INTV thresholds generated from the four East Asian countries, we 
propose to pick the lowest rate, i.e. the ten percent threshold of Korea, to be the 
minimum threshold. Thus, under Scenario #3, when Intervention Index (INTV) is low 
due to a low value of ( )H rHreserves pp int+  and a high ( )H rHreservesHexr ppp int++ , we can 
confidently conclude that the monetary authority is adopting a flexible exchange rate 
policy.  
However, we have to add a caveat here. Under few circumstances, we may 
not be able to conclusively assert that the central bank has voluntarily adopted the 
flexible policy stance. For instance, under the situation when there is a high 
probability of a very volatile local currency and a low probability of a successful 
exchange market intervention, the policy maker may reluctantly keep their foreign 
exchange market intervention activities to a minimum level, and thus avoiding the 
high cost of intervention. Hence, we need to carefully examine the probabilities of 
each component of the index to squeeze as much information about the nature of the 
market and the monetary policy stance.   
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In addition to the earlier three possibilities, we can also add one more 
Scenario (#4) to capture the period of high foreign exchange market pressures, 
including the periods of currency and financial crises. More importantly, we can also 
apply this category to capture the period of managed or dirty floating ---the middle 
regimes. Under this scenario, the INTV index is going to fall between the low and the 
high thresholds, ( )LowINTVHigh >> . This situation appears when at least two of 
the three components of the INTV index ( )H rHreservesHexr ppp int,, are relatively high. During 
the crisis or volatile period, the monetary authorities are often found to be very active 
in trying to keep the local currency stable (thus high ( )H rHreserves pp int+ ). However, the 
attacks on the local currency are very severe, reflected by the persistently volatile 
exchange rate ---high ( )Hexrp , hence keeping the INTV index between the minimum 
(10 percent) and the maximum (90 percent) thresholds. 
 
6. What the empirical results say about the exchange rate regime 
6.1 Indonesia 
 The persistently high ( )INTV index, well above (0.90), from 1985 to1996, 
seems to suggest that the monetary authority had adopted an active intervention 
strategy to keep rupiah stable (Figure 1 and Table 7). When we decompose the 
intervention index into its three key components, it also becomes very clear that the 
Bank of Indonesia, the central bank, adjusted its key intervention interest rate to 
manage rupiah. We do know that all the way until 1995, the intervention spread for 
the rupiah of Bank Indonesia was only 3 percent at the most from the central parity, 
suggesting a fairly rigid exchange rate regime adopted by the monetary authority 
during this period. During this period of 10 years, we can therefore conclusively 
conclude that the Bank Indonesia has adopted the rigid exchange rate regime ---
Scenario #1. 
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To introduce a bit more flexibility in its exchange rate regime, the intervention 
spread band was widened three times from 3 percent in December 1995 to 5 percent 
in June 1996, and to 8 percent in September 1996 (Djiwandono (2000)). The central 
bank further allowed rupiah to move more freely again in July 1997 by further 
extending the intervention band to 12 percent.  
 During the peak period and the early recovery stage from the East Asian 
currency crisis, from 1997 to 2001, we notice a relatively lower ( )INTV  index, 
reaching the lowest index in 2000 at around (0.465).  During this period, the central 
banks employed both its key rate and foreign exchange reserves to try to manage 
the rupiah, but to no avail. The smooth probability of the rupiah ( )Hexrp shot up to the 
level as high as (0.989) in 1998 from the very modest rate of at most around (0.008) 
in early to mid-1990s. This period represents Scenario #4, where the ( )INTV  index 
was averaging below the maximum threshold due to a combination of volatile 
exchange rate pressure ( )Hexrp  and high intervention ( )H rHreserves pp int+  index.  From the 
smooth probabilities, we can also conclude that the rupiah foreign exchange market 
experienced its most volatile and extreme market pressure in 1998, with each of all 
three components of the ( )INTV  index, ( )H rHreservesHexr ppp int,,  ranged between (0.969) 
to (0.989).    
From early 2002 to August 2007, we found conclusive evidence that the Bank 
of Indonesia has returned to its pre-1997 policy of tight exchange rate management 
(Scenario 1). The annual smooth probability of the ( )INTV  rose to (0.99) in 2003 to 
2006. More importantly, as in 1990-1996, the monetary authority reverted back to the 
policy of frequent adjustment to its key interest rate ---with the average smooth 
probability of the interest rate well above (0.90) between January 2002 to December 
2006--- to tightly manage the fluctuations of the Indonesian rupiah.     
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6.2 Korea 
 Looking at Table 8 and Figure 2, the high smoothed probability of the INTV 
index for the period from 1985 to 1994 suggests that the monetary policy authority 
had always been active in the money market to rigidly manage the won ---Scenario 
#1. The role of interest rate policy was very dominant during this period, as 
suggested by the high ( )H rpint . Starting in 1990, the monetary authority in Korea also 
adopted the so-called market-average system (MARS) where the won/U.S. dollar 
nominal exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate within a specified band of the basic 
rate which was revised daily (Dornbusch and Park (1999)). When this system was 
first introduced, the won/U.S. dollar was allowed to vary within a very narrow ±  0.4 
percent of the basic rate. In the mid-1990s, the band was widened to ± 2.25 percent. 
With the INTV index averaging well above 90 percent level and the average 
smoothed probability of the won around 0 percent, the Bank of Korea (BOK) was 
indeed successful in tightly managing the won rate against the US dollar from mid of 
1980s to late 1994.   
 Between 1995 to 1996, the won had become significantly more volatile, 
despite the continued effort of the monetary authority to manage it by actively 
adjusting the interest rate. The average ( )INTV index during these two years has 
fallen dramatically to around (0.54), as a result of strong pressure in the foreign 
exchange market. Given the persistently high smooth probability of the ( )H rpint , we 
would still categorize this period as the rigid exchange rate period, although the 
central bank was clearly less successful in reining the volatility of the won compared 
to the previous years. 
On November 20th, 1997, clearly feeling the rising pressures of the early 
stages of the 1997 East Asia currency crisis, the BOK widened the MARS band to 
about ± 10 percent. In addition to the interest rate policy, the monetary authority 
began to actively conduct open market operation by selling its foreign exchange 
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reserve. The smoothed probability of the reserve ( )Hreservesp  hovered around 2 percent 
from early to mid-1990s, and jumped significantly in 1997 to around 57 percent. The 
band was finally abolished on the 16th of December 1997, when Korea was officially 
in a crisis.  
At the height of the crisis, January 1998 until December 1998, the ( )INTV  
index was averaging above (0.60), with two of the components of the ( )INTV  index, 
( )H rHexr pp int, , were extremely high at around (0.988). It also became obvious that the 
monetary authority had started to directly intervene in the foreign exchange market, 
as suggested by a significant rise in the smoothed probability of reserves from 
around (0.06) for the period of 1995-1996 to about (0.55) for the period of January 
1998 to December 1998. We can therefore conclude that the levels of the smoothed 
probabilities for all three components of the INTV index during the period of 1997-
1998 are consistent with the Crisis Scenario (Scenario #4).  
In 1999, Korea began the recovery process, and returned to a more stable 
macroeconomic environment. Despite the presence of persistently high volatility in 
the foreign exchange market ( )99>Hexrp , the intervention of the BOK was clearly 
reduced as compared from the levels reported during 1997-1998. The ( )INTV  index 
is still close to 15 percent, still slightly above the minimum threshold for the flexible 
exchange rate regime category.  
The post-2000 exchange rate regime can clearly be characterized as the 
flexible / floating period with no evidences of government interventions reported from 
the smoothed probabilities ---low values for both ( )Hreservesp  and ( )H rpint . In the 
presence of volatile won market, the ( )INTV index was averaging at its lowest level 
during the last two decades, averaging less than 1 percent from January 2000 to July 
2007. This leads us to conclude that Korea has voluntarily moved to a de-facto 
flexible regime (Scenario #3). Annual Report publication of the BOK from 2000 to 
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2006 describes its exchange rate regime to the effect that while it stands ready to 
undertake appropriate measures to avoid abrupt fluctuations in its exchange rate, the 
won, in principle, is allowed to fluctuate freely according to its demand and supply in 
the foreign exchange market.      
 
6.3 Singapore 
 It is clear from these statistics that the rigid management of the exchange rate 
policy continued to be the centrepiece of the monetary policy in the country until 2007 
(Table 9 and Figure 3). With the exception of the crisis period of 1997-1998 and parts 
of 2001, the INTV index for Singapore was persistently well above 90 percent. These 
statistics are consistent with a number of official reports and studies conducted at 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), which all suggest that the MAS periodically 
intervened in the foreign exchange market with the extent of the foreign exchange 
intervention determined by the exchange rate target bounded by an undisclosed 
band (MAS 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2007).  
 From the average smoothed probabilities presented in Table 9, we can also 
construe that the MAS actively employed both the reserve and the interest rate policy 
to manage the exchange rate of the local currency for the large part of the past two 
decades. It is also interesting to note here that during the pre-1997 financial crisis, 
the interest rate was the main instrument of the monetary authority, reflected by the 
high smoothed probability. A different practice emerged from January 1999 to August 
2007. During this period, the reserve has clearly become the primary instrument to 
manage the Singapore dollar to maintain the rigid exchange rate policy. Between 
1999 to 2007, the foreign exchange reserve of the country (minus gold) has 
increased by more than US$ 100 billion to reach a total of around US$ 226 billion in 
late 2007.     
  
6.4 Thailand 
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 In general, our test results confirm that the Bank of Thailand, like the other 
three East Asian economies’ central banks, has intervened actively to tightly manage 
the baht from 1985 to 1996 (Table 10). The average smoothed probability of 
the ( )INTV  for 1991-1996 was well above 99 percent and the active intervention in 
the money market (via adjustments in the interest rate) helped keep the average 
smoothed probability of the ( )Hexrp  well below 1 percent (Scenario #1). 
From the empirical findings, we can also conclude that the exchange rate 
regime was under Scenario #4 (the Crisis case) during 1997- 1999. These three 
years saw the full efforts of the central bank to defend the local currency by adjusting 
its key interest rate and selling off of foreign exchange reserves, as suggested by the 
high smoothed probabilities of interest rate and reserve. Despite the massive 
intervention efforts, the baht lost its value substantially against the US dollar and was 
very volatile. 
Since 2000, we saw evidences of less rigid exchange rate regime. The level 
of smooth probability for the ( )INTV ranged between (0.42) to slightly above (0.60), 
significantly lower than the level during the pre-1997 period, and at the same time the 
currency market continued to be very volatile with the smoothed probability of ( )Hexrp  
at around (0.99), except for 2007. We can therefore conclude that the Bank of 
Thailand remained active in managing the volatility of its currency, but the exchange 
rate regime has arguably been less rigid since 2000 (Scenario #4). We also note 
however that there was an increase in intervention in 2005 and 2006. In addition, 
while for most of 2000-2004, the intervention was predominantly in the money market 
via frequent adjustments in the key interest rate, the reserve position was also more 
volatile in 2005 and 2006, suggesting active intervention through open market 
operation of the foreign exchange reserves.  
 
7. Brief Concluding Remarks 
 29
Frankel, et.al. (2001) nails it right at the very heart of the challenge when they 
argued that credibility and transparency are the core of the current debate about 
exchange rate regimes. Like many other studies in the past, their work also 
emphasizes the difficulties facing the efforts to verify the de-facto exchange rate 
regime being adopted by a country.   
Our paper revisited the debate on the de-facto versus de-jure exchange rate 
regimes adopted by four countries in East Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore and South-Korea. The study has empirically extended early studies in two 
fronts. The first one is with the employment of SWARCH and the Extreme Value 
testing to estimate the degree of the foreign exchange intervention and the 
thresholds. The second extension is with the up-to-date data coverage by including 
observations up to mid of 2007. 
The study is able to conclusively conclude that only Korea has shifted to adopt a de-
facto flexible exchange rate regime during the post-1997 period. In contrast, 
Indonesia and Singapore have returned to their pre-1997 rigid exchange rate 
regimes. While there are evidences that Thailand has relaxed their degree of 
intervention since the 1997 financial crisis, but the intervention activities remain 
significant, suggesting more of a dirty float rather than a flexible exchange rate 
strategy. In short, we reject the “hollow middle” hypothesis (Eichengreen (1994)). 
Indonesia, Thailand and South-Korea have officially announced their 
intentions to adopt the inflation targeting (IT) strategy as the anchor of their monetary 
policies during the post-1997 financial crisis. Confirming the findings of this study, 
Sharma and Siregar (2008), however, found dominant weights still assigned to the 
exchange rate volatility in the reaction functions of the Bank of Indonesia and the 
Bank of Thailand, suggesting rather lack of commitment to the IT policy. It would be 
interesting for future researches to examine further which of the nominal anchors, i.e. 
between the inflation targeting and the rigid exchange rate regime, would be a more 
appropriate policy to serve these East Asian economies.   
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Table 1: Summary of Findings of Studies (with exclusive focus on East Asia alone) 
Regarding the Post-crisis Exchange Rate Regimes In Some East Asian Countries   
 
Studies Observation 
Period 
Method(s) Indonesia Korea Singapore Thailand 
Kawai and Akiyama 
(2000) 
January 1999-
December 1999 
Frankel-Wei Inconclusive U.S.Dollar-peg 
reversion 
U.S. Dollar-peg 
reversion 
U.S.Dollar-peg 
reversion 
Gan Wee Beng 
(2000) 
July 2, 1997 – 
September 30, 
1999 
Simplified and 
Modified Version of 
Frankel-Wei 
Greater Flexibility Greater Flexibility Greater Flexibility Greater Flexibility 
Baig (2001) 1999-2000 Standard Deviation 
and Frankel-Wei 
Inconclusive U.S. Dollar-peg 
reversion 
Not Included Increased Flexibility 
McKinnon (2001) 1999-May 2000 Frankel-Wei Still in quasi-crisis 
mode 
High-frequency 
dollar-peg 
reversion 
High-frequency 
dollar-peg reversion 
High-frequency 
dollar-peg reversion 
Ogawa (2001) Various sub-periods 
from July 1998 – 
September 2000 
Frankel-Wei  
U.S. Dollar-peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar-peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar-peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar-peg 
reversion 
McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2002) 
January 1, 1999 –  
April 22, 2002 
Standard Deviation 
and Frankel-Wei 
Floating High-frequency 
U.S. dollar- peg 
reversion 
High-frequency 
U.S. dollar- peg 
reversion 
High-frequency 
U.S. dollar- peg 
reversion 
Kawai (2002) 1999-June 2002 
 
Frankel-Wei Floating Managed Floating Managed Float Managed Floating 
Hernandez and 
Montiel (2003) 
 
1999-2001 
Standard Deviation Managed Float Managed Float Not Included Managed Float 
Fukuda and Ohno 
(2003) 
Various sub-periods 
from February 2, 
1998 – September 
5, 2002 
Frankel-Wei  
 
Not Included 
 
U.S. Dollar- peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar- peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar- peg 
reversion 
Kim, Kim, and 
Wang (forthcoming) 
Two sample 
periods:  January 
1999-June 2001; 
January 1999-
December 2003 
Structural VAR 
(SVAR) 
 
 
Increased Flexibility 
 
 
Increased Flexibility 
 
 
 
Increased Flexibility 
 
 
Increased Flexibility 
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Table: 1 (cont’d) 
Summary of Findings of Studies (Non- exclusive focus on East Asia) 
Regarding the Post-crisis Exchange Rate Regimes In Some East Asian Countries 
 
 IMF Classification based on Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Indonesia Independently 
Floating 
Independently 
Floating 
Managed Floating  Managed Floating Managed Floating 
Korea Independently 
Floating 
Independently 
Floating 
Independently 
Floating 
Independently 
Floating 
Independently 
Floating 
Singapore Managed Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating 
Thailand Managed Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating 
 
 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger Classification (2005) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Indonesia Intermediate 
Dirty/Crawling Peg 
Intermediate 
Dirty/Crawling Peg 
-------- 
 
-------- --------- 
Korea Fix Fix -------- -------- --------- 
Singapore Fix Fix -------- -------- --------- 
Thailand Float Float ------- -------- --------- 
 
 Reinhart-Rogoff Classification (2004) 
 Indonesia Korea Singapore Thailand 
Periods August 1997-March 
1999 
April 1999-
December 2001 
July 1998-December 
2001 
December 1998-
December 2001 
January 1998-
December 2001 
 Freely Falling/Freely 
Floating 
Freely Floating Freely Floating Managed Floating Managed Floating 
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Table 2:  
Univariate Statistics on Exchange Rates (EXR), Reserves, and Interest Rates (INT) 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Normality 
Test 
LB(24) LBS(24) 
Indonesia        
EXR 1.046 8.029 7.096 80.473 70047.7** 59.44** 17.38 
Reserves 1.912 9.861 4.519 42.692 18711.6** 32.98 13.19 
INT -0.017 4.859 2.859 48.729 23981.6** 47.43** 47.95** 
        
Korea        
EXR 0.092 3.364 8.912 117.218 150897** 78.21** 7.83 
Reserves 2.024 6.800 0.957 9.242 479.556** 31.68 111.19** 
INT -0.016 1.061 1.202 14.06 1441.28** 43.93** 49.38** 
        
Singapore        
EXR -0.128 1.273 0.272 7.212 203.654** 33.32 160.3** 
Reserves 0.849 1.07 0.041 3.773 6.829* 60.06** 30.07 
INT -0.01 0.528 0.178 19.354 3021.25** 29.66 69.88** 
        
Thailand        
EXR 0.116 2.647 2.691 26.762 6702.87** 57.35** 262.62** 
Reserves 1.443 4.286 0.123 13.156 1165.31** 122.03** 375.29** 
INT -0.03 1.973 0.36 15.14 1669.95** 70.93** 130.81** 
 
Notes:  EXR and Reserves in percentage changes and INT in first-difference.  
            JB-normality test: Jarque-Bera test, which is distributed 22χ . 
   LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
   LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
   
**
, 
*
 significant at the 1 and 5  percent level, respectively. 
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Table 3: 
Regime switching ARCH regressions for percentage changes in exchange rates   
 
 Rupiah 
Normal 
SWARCH (3,1) 
Won 
Normal 
SWARCH (2,2) 
Singapore dollar 
Normal 
SWARCH (2,1) 
Thailand baht 
Student t 
SWARCH (2,1) 
 
φ0 0.21** (0.02) -0.02 (0.04) -0.14* (0.06) -0.02 (0.04) 
φ1 0.35** (0.04) 0.57** (0.06) 0.26** (0.06) 0.29** (0.08) 
α0 0.02** (0.00) 0.08** (0.03) 0.68** (0.11) 0.29** (0.10) 
α1 0.66** (0.18) 0.61** (0.26) 0.13 (0.16) 0.25 (0.15) 
α2   0.24** (0.11)   
p11 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.99 
p22 0.90 0.98 0.83 0.99 
p33 0.96 --- --- --- 
LR test  
(m = 1 vs m = 2) 578.08
**
 117.1** 33.7** 53.67** 
LR test  
(m = 2 vs. m = 3) 43.4** -2.64 -0.92 -21.02 
df --- --- --- 3.51 
LB(24) 14.1 37.41* 8.93 26.75 
LBS(24) 43.4** 22.96 24.49 5.13 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 LR test: Likelihood ratio test which is distributed 2rχ . 
   LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
   LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
            
**
, 
*
 significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  
 39
 
Table 4: 
Regime switching ARCH regressions for percentage changes in reserves   
 
 Indonesia 
Normal 
SWARCH (2,1) 
Korea 
Student t 
SWARCH (2,1) 
Singapore  
Student t 
SWARCH (2,2) 
Thailand  
Normal 
SWARCH (2,2) 
 
φ0 1.19** (0.29) 1.31** (0.28) 0.67** (0.09) 1.31** (0.17) 
φ1         0.01  (0.07) -0.00 (0.08) 0.21** (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) 
α0 13.71** (2.4) 11.58** (1.54) 0.61** (0.11) 2.63** (0.61) 
α1 0.38** (0.13) 0.20* (0.1) 0.16* (0.08) 0.21 (0.12) 
α2   0.00 (0.08) 0.24* (0.12) 
p11 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 
p22 0.87 0.98 0.98 0.98 
LR test 
(m = 1 vs m = 2) 160.28
**
 22.08** 6.16* 11.6** 
LR test  
(m = 2 vs. m = 3) 5.75 -76.9 -12.3 2.94 
df --- 7.18 14.37 --- 
LB(24) 37.54* 35.64 38.05* 49.48** 
LBS(24) 8.39 19.6 24.62 28.40 
          Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
             LR test: Likelihood ratio test which distributed 2rχ . 
    LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
    LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
             
**
, 
*
 significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 5: 
Regime switching ARCH regressions for first-difference in interest rates   
 
 Indonesia 
Student t 
SWARCH (2,1) 
Korea 
Normal 
SWARCH (3,1) 
Singapore  
Normal 
SWARCH (2,2) 
Thailand  
Student t 
SWARCH (2,2) 
 
φ0 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.002 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 
φ1         -0.06**  (0.01) 0.16** (0.04) -0.03 (0.12) 0.17 (0.08) 
α0 0.03 (0.04) 0.0002** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.02* (0.01) 
α1 3.38 (4.50) 0.43** (0.16) 0.48 (0.30) 0.89** (0.24) 
α2 --- --- 0.22* (0.11) 0.32* (0.15) 
p11 0.89 0.65 0.81 0.99 
p22 0.24 0.70 0.75 0.99 
p33 --- 0.95 --- --- 
LR test 
(m = 1 vs m = 2) 16.24
**
 124.74** 92.03** 22.92** 
LR test  
(m = 2 vs. m = 3) 0.0 29.58
**
 0.37 No convergence for 3 
regimes 
df 2.37 --- ---  
LB(24) 32.92 21.42 19.32 21.19 
LBS(24) 23.29 6.17 37.62* 37.87* 
 
  Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 LR test: Likelihood ratio test which is distributed 2rχ . 
   LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
   LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 224χ . 
            
**
, 
*
 significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 6: EVT Thresholds of INTV Index 
 
 
  
Country 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 
Indonesia 
 
0.89 
 
0.42 
 
Korea 
 
0.90 
 
0.10 
 
Thailand 
 
0.94 
 
0.35 
 
Singapore 
 
0.98 
 
0.67 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Table 7: Monthly Average Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Indonesia 
 
 Intervention 
)(INTV  
Interest Rate 
H
rpint  
Rupiah 
H
exrp  
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
H
reservesp  
 
1985-1990 0.978 0.869 0.059 0.199 
1991 0.999 0.918 0.0003 0.229 
1992 0.999 0.882 0.0000 0.003 
1993 0.999 0.928 0.0000 0.003 
1994 0.999 0.853 0.0000 0.006 
1995 0.999 0.896 0.0000 0.003 
1996 0.989 0.834 0.008 0.009 
1997 0.772 0.848 0.503 0.181 
1998 0.662 0.969 0.989 0.972 
1999 0.605 0.791 0.968 0.749 
2000 0.465 0.834 0.946 0.017 
2001 0.561 0.815 0.904 0.384 
2002 0.905 0.939 0.103 0.006 
2003 0.999 0.971 0.0001 0.002 
2004 0.997 0.900 0.002 0.002 
2005 0.999 0.882 0.0003 0.003 
2006 0.999 0.859 0.0007 0.016 
2007 (up to August) 0.659 0.606 0.006 0.002 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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 Table 8: Monthly Average Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Korea 
 
 Intervention 
)(INTV  
Interest Rate 
H
rpint  
Won 
H
exrp  
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
H
reservesp  
 
1985-1990 0.977 0.651 0.040 0.721 
1991 0.996 0.998 0.004 0.002 
1992 0.823 0.451 0.0008 0.0009 
1993 0.999 0.995 0.0007 0.0007 
1994 0.997 0.999 0.003 0.0005 
1995 0.561 0.978 0.844 0.0032 
1996 0.519 0.999 0.940 0.017 
1997 0.624 0.998 0.919 0.573 
1998 0.613 0.988 0.998 0.642 
1999 0.146 0.211 0.991 0.049 
2000 0.003 0.0006 0.976 0.003 
2001 0.004 0.002 0.996 0.002 
2002 0.0009 0.0003 0.996 0.0006 
2003 0.018 0.0006 0.987 0.0177 
2004 0.004 0.0006 0.983 0.003 
2005 0.0009 0.0005 0.955 0.0004 
2006 0.0011 0.0006 0.991 0.0005 
2007 (up to July) 0.003 0.003 0.578 0.0008 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Table 9: Monthly Average Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Singapore 
 
 Intervention 
)(INTV  
Interest Rate 
H
rpint  
Singapore Dollar 
H
exrp  
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
H
reservesp  
 
1985-1990 0.942 0.638 0.046 0.101 
1991 0.924 0.812 0.050 0.080 
1992 0.991 0.666 0.005 0.043 
1993 0.981 0.592 0.008 0.015 
1994 0.995 0.818 0.004 0.007 
1995 0.979 0.728 0.012 0.006 
1996 0.995 0.640 0.003 0.005 
1997 0.729 0.940 0.488 0.019 
1998 0.518 0.817 0.910 0.156 
1999 0.952 0.809 0.059 0.729 
2000 0.994 0.447 0.009 0.984 
2001 0.836 0.553 0.361 0.991 
2002 0.993 0.375 0.009 0.987 
2003 0.972 0.072 0.031 0.979 
2004 0.993 0.286 0.008 0.960 
2005 0.988 0.415 0.012 0.722 
2006 0.977 0.051 0.008 0.246 
2007 (up to August) 0.985 0.567 0.010 0.178 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Table 10: Monthly Average Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Thailand 
 
 Intervention 
)(INTV  
Interest Rate 
H
rpint  
Baht 
H
exrp  
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
H
reservesp  
 
1985-1990 0.949 0.929 0.142 0.846 
1991 0.999 0.995 0.0005 0.149 
1992 0.999 0.861 0.0001 0.029 
1993 0.999 0.932 0.0001 0.013 
1994 0.999 0.956 0.0001 0.007 
1995 0.999 0.957 0.0004 0.023 
1996 0.998 0.936 0.003 0.131 
1997 0.778 0.988 0.625 0.904 
1998 0.652 0.931 0.999 0.949 
1999 0.655 0.968 0.999 0.936 
2000 0.572 0.922 0.999 0.454 
2001 0.467 0.859 0.999 0.042 
2002 0.477 0.909 0.999 0.013 
2003 0.444 0.807 0.999 0.031 
2004 0.459 0.811 0.999 0.068 
2005 0.621 0.996 0.998 0.643 
2006 0.637 0.924 0.999 0.845 
2007 (up to August) 0.416 0.624 0.665 0.479 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
 
 46
Figure 1: 
Probability of Intervention Estimates for Indonesia 
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Figure 2: 
Probability of Intervention Estimates for Korea 
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Figure 3: 
Probability of Intervention Estimates for Singapore 
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Figure 4: 
Probability of Intervention Estimates for Thailand 
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